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2019 — Medicaid will be reex­
amined this year, in all its legal 
complexities, by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which has agreed to hear 
California’s appeal in the case 
Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living 
Center of Southern California. The 
Court’s ruling could fundamen­
tally alter states’ accountability to 
beneficiaries and providers when 
their official conduct allegedly 
violates Medicaid’s essential fed­
eral requirements.
The Maxwell-Jolly case was pre­
cipitated by a series of deep cuts 
to provider payments that were 
enacted by the California legisla­
ture and aimed at services used 
predominantly by the state’s most 
severely disabled beneficiaries. 
The payment reductions were 
halted by the U.S. Court of Ap­
peals for the Ninth Circuit, but 
this action by no means ended 
the dispute. Indeed, the question 
before the Supreme Court is of 
far greater consequence than that 
of specific provider payments: it 
is whether beneficiaries and pro­
viders have the right to seek ju­
dicial redress when they allege 
that state conduct abridges fed­
eral law and threatens health and 
safety.
The statute regulating Medic­
aid, unlike that underlying Medi­
care, does not expressly address 
the question of whether private 
persons deserve access to the 
courts in order to prevent harm 
arising from potentially unlaw­
ful state conduct. Virtually since 
Medicaid’s inception,1 states have 
disputed the ability of beneficia­
ries and providers to hold Medi­
caid programs judicially account­
able under federal law. Over the 
years, a series of Supreme Court 
decisions have offered a partial 
answer: private individuals can 
sue when they believe a state’s 
conduct has violated a right un­
der Medicaid. In such cases, the 
suit is brought under a law dat­
ing back to the Civil War Amend­
ments and commonly referred 
to by its U.S. Code number, Sec­
tion 1983, which enables private 
parties to sue to stop state inter­
ference with a federal legal right.
But many of Medicaid’s re­
quirements, including some of 
the most important ones that 
give real meaning to the legal 
right to coverage itself, have 
never been definitively determined 
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to fall either within or outside 
the realm of legal “right.” One 
such duty directly addresses the 
crucial issue of access to care by 
requiring states to assure that 
provider payments are not only 
economical and efficient but also 
“sufficient to enlist enough pro­
viders so that care and services 
are available . . . at least to the 
extent that such care and services 
are available to the general pop­
ulation in the geographic area.”2 
The purpose of this equal­access 
duty could not be clearer: to as­
sure that the right to Medicaid 
is more than an empty promise 
of care. Indeed, the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) further strength­
ened Congress’s expectation that 
Medicaid would result in access 
to care, by separately clarifying 
states’ obligation to ensure that 
services are made available with 
reasonable promptness.3
It would appear axiomatic that 
when a state duty directly under­
girding the Medicaid entitlement 
is alleged to have been violated, 
the courts will be available to 
intervene. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has concluded that the 
courts were available to the 
pharmaceutical industry when it 
sued to halt an alleged violation 
by the state of Maine of Medic­
aid’s prescription­drug coverage 
requirements. In a case brought 
by the Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA), the Court ultimately 
ruled that Maine’s law was con­
sistent with federal standards4 
— yet the majority of the jus­
tices did not question the appro­
priateness of the lawsuit itself. 
Since it involved no federal 
“rights,” no action could be tak­
en under Section 1983. But PhR­
MA’s claim centered on an al­
leged conflict between state and 
federal law, so the industry group 
was presumed to have the right 
to proceed directly under the U.S. 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, 
which renders unconstitutional 
any state law that conflicts with 
federal law, regardless of wheth­
er the federal law at issue cre­
ates a “right.”
In Maxwell-Jolly, the Ninth Cir­
cuit similarly relied on the Su­
premacy Clause in finding a right 
to sue. In its ruling, the court 
noted that Medicaid’s equal­ 
access statute itself did not con­
fer a Section 1983 right, but it 
found that the allegation of a 
conflict between state action 
and federal law brought the 
claims within the scope of the 
Supremacy Clause, thereby con­
ferring on plaintiffs the right to 
go to court. It is this critical 
holding — that even where no 
federal right is involved, Medic­
aid beneficiaries and providers 
can sue to prevent unconstitu­
tional conduct — that is now 
before the Supreme Court.
To blunt the implications of 
their desired ruling that private 
individuals have no means to 
challenge states’ potentially un­
constitutional conduct, the states 
argue that enforcement of Med­
icaid law by the federal govern­
ment is sufficient. They further 
argue that Supremacy Clause liti­
gation should be curbed only in 
the case of challenges to state 
conduct under welfare spending 
programs such as Medicaid, whose 
constitutional basis is the Spend­
ing Clause (which grants Congress 
the power to collect taxes and 
spend them for the country’s 
general welfare), not challenges 
to state conduct that allegedly vi­
olates other types of federal 
laws. But nothing in the Suprem­
acy Clause cases decided by the 
Court to date allows such a dis­
tinction: until now, all claims 
that state conduct violates the 
Constitution have been treated 
equally in the eyes of the law.
The states’ claim that federal 
oversight is sufficient is particu­
larly ironic given the history of 
federal enforcement of the equal­
access statute. Despite the fact 
that this protection has been part 
of the federal Medicaid statute 
for 22 years, the Department of 
Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) has never issued de­
tailed compliance standards, 
much less enforced them. In 
2010, the federal government 
promised to issue standards and 
in fact ultimately disapproved 
California’s rate cuts, but disap­
proval came years after the cuts 
took effect and long after they 
were enjoined in court. Even if 
final rules are issued (a process 
that could take years), there is 
no guarantee of enforcement. 
Indeed, DHHS’s track record for 
Medicaid oversight is abysmal, 
and for good reason: the statute 
offers the secretary of health 
and human services virtually no 
meaningful enforcement tools. 
She can refuse to approve the 
state’s payment rates (as DHHS 
ultimately did in this case) and 
can threaten to withhold all fed­
eral funding until the violation 
is fixed. But the law contains no 
practical steps such as providing 
incentives to increase payment 
rates, ordering an adjustment, or 
imposing intermediate penalties 
for failure to comply. Further­
more, the federal administrative 
review process is painfully slow, 
leaving beneficiaries with no pro­
tection against immediate injury. 
A decision by the Court in Cali­
fornia’s favor would shield states 
from judicial accountability un­




less a separate state law could 
be found to serve as the basis 
to sue; beneficiaries could be 
left unprotected against conduct 
that immediately threatens health 
and life.
It is hardly news where Med­
icaid is concerned that states are 
reeling from a combination of 
bad economic conditions, high 
poverty, a weak employer insur­
ance market, escalating medical 
costs, and an approach to fed­
eral Medicaid financing that, 
while nominally generous, in fact 
places far too great a burden on 
weakened state economies. But 
the imperative to restructure fed­
eral–state Medicaid financing is 
separate from the question wheth­
er the poor should be barred 
from seeking judicial redress for 
violations of the very requirements 
that give Medicaid its power and 
meaning.
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